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PREFACE 
This report describes California's initial experience under the Uniform Deter-
minate Sentencing Act (1976). Because of the preliminary quality of available 
information1 the report does not analyze the effectiveness of the law in meeting the 
fundamental objectives of criminal sentencing. Rather, the report suggests an agen-
da for further research on the effects of the law. Despite its preliminary nature, the 
information documented here should aid California policymakers in assessing the 
success of the law and in considering appropriate changes to it. The report should 
also be useful to policymakers in other states and to others interested in sentencing 
reform and criminal justice research. Pursuit of research projects described in the 
report would provide substantial information about California's approach to deter-
minate sentencing. 
The research described here, completed in 1979, was funded by the California 
Community Release Board. The Board was renamed the Board of Prison Terms as 




To remedy apparent injustices in criminal sentencing, a growing number of 
states have adopted determinate or other structured sentencing reforms. Califor-
nia's determinate sentencing law is unique among those in the degree to which the 
state legislature determines the details of sentencing decisions. Through the law 
the California legislature not only established general sentencing policy but also 
limited the variation in sentences, defined the principal bases for such variation, 
and established the specific lengths of prison terms. For most crimes, judges can 
still decide not to send convicted felons to prison. However, for those sentenced to 
prison, judges must calculate the length of prison terms by choosing among a 
narrow range of statutory options. Similarly, the law severely restricts the power 
of prison or parole officials to influence the length of prison terms: only by following 
elaborate due process procedures can they revoke limited amounts of good time. 
This report reviews the background and objectives of the California determi-
nate sentencing law and makes preliminary observations about its early impact 
drawn from interviews and analyses of criminal justice data. It then suggests a 
series of research projects designed to more fully examine some of its long-range 
effects. 
There have been changes in the operation of the California criminal justice 
system since the July 1, 1977 effective date of the determinate sentencing 
However, it is difficult to ascribe many of these shifts to the new law per se, since 
it was adopted during a period of related changes both in California nationally. 
Throughout the nation, a growing proportion of felons were being incar-
cerated. Federal and state courts were extending the due process rights prison-
ers. The California legislature passed laws imposing mandatory prison terms and 
modifying the Probation Subsidy Act; California voters overwhelmingly passed 
Proposition 7 increasing prison terms for homicide. California voters also passed 
Proposition 13 which drastically reduced local property tax revenues, leading some 
to predict that more felons would be sentenced to state rather than local 
Taken together, these developments make it difficult to 
changes in the criminal justice to the determinate sentencing law or to these 
events. However, we can of the California 
system in the early period of determinate sentencing and out possible effects 
of the determinate sentence law. 
In general, we make the following observations: 
• Under the determinate sentence law, both legislators and judges are more 
directly accountable to the public for sentencing decisions. It also extends 
felons greater procedural protection, both at the time of sentencing and 
while serving prison terms. 
• The determinate sentence law has not disrupted the court process. Court 
personnel appear to have adjusted reasonably well to its complex provi-
sions. 
1The Rand Corporation is studying the impact of Proposition 13 on the California criminal justice 
system. The results of this study are forthcoming. 
v 
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• Prison commitment rates have increased substantially under the new law. 
However, this continues a preexisting trend that began in 1972. Determi-
nate sentencing may have extended this trend and stabilized it at a higher 
level than might otherwise have occurred. 
• California faces a major problem of prison crowding. The new law's elimi-
nation of Adult Authority "safety valve" parole release powers may have 
exacerbated this problem. 
• The average length of prison terms in the early determinate sentence 
period is slightly lower than under the old indeterminate system. This may 
reflect continuation of a trend that began in 1976. However, it is improper 
to conclude that felons are being sentenced more leniently, because many 
felons who previously would have served jail terms of at most one year are 
now serving prison terms. Moreover, recent legislation has increased pris-
on terms. 
• Since passing the new law, the California legislature has continued to 
increase imprisonment and the length of prison terms, all of which will 
further aggravate prison crowding. 
• The determinate sentencing law appears to have contributed to more equi-
table sentencing by reducing variability in the length of prison terms for 
those convicted of similar crimes. However, amendments changing penal-
ties have introduced temporal disparities, and the effect of prosecutorial 
discretion on sentencing variation has not yet been definitively measured. 
• The new law's specification of prison terms has turned plea bargaining into 
more meaningful sentence bargaining and has probably facilitated earlier 
negotiated settlements of lesser felonies. This may have resulted in more 
efficient allocation of judicial time. The law may also have generally in-
creased the discretion available to prosecutors to control dispositions and 
sentences causing some to warn of potential threats to achieving the law's 
purposes of just and equitable punishment. 
• Even though the new law establishes punishment as the primary objective 
of imprisonment, funds to be expended for prison treatment programs 
have not been reduced. 
• The administrative costs of implementing determinate sentencing do not 
appear high in light of the substantial costs associated with overall crimi-
nal justice administration-but the correctional costs resulting from in-
creased commitments and penalty increases in the aftermath ofthe law are 
substantial. 
• As anticipated, parole caseloads were substantially reduced during the 
period the law placed a one-year limit on parole supervision, but caseloads 
and costs have begun to climb with amending legislation that extended the 
parole period to three years. 
• A small sample ofinterviewed inmates liked the certainty of sentences and 
term lengths set up by the original law, but disliked the penalty increase 
amendments. Inmates were disturbed by the process of retroactive appli-
cation of the law which they saw as arbitrary. 
Prison commitments per 100,000 California population rose from 32.4 in 1977 
to 39.2 in 1978, the highest rate in the history of the Department of Corrections. 
vii 
There are a number that appear to have influenced the trend toward 
increased imprisonment. These include: a perception by judges and legislators that 
the public favors tougher penalties; contested judicial elections in which sentencing 
practices have been an issue; determinate sentencing law requirements making it 
easier to monitor judicial performance; and greater willingness of defendants and 
judges to accept short defined prison sentences for relatively nonserious crimes. 
The continuing increase in prison population raises serious problems for the 
Department of Corrections and the California legislature. Population pressures 
have already required the double celling of inmates. Demographic projections 
suggest that even aging of the post-World-War II "baby boom" will not avoid future 
prison crowding because of migration to California of high-crime-prone young men. 
In turn, excessive prison population will likely contribute to greater prison violence 
and disciplinary problems. Moreover, crowded prisons invite judicial intervention, 
potential restrictions on new prison commitments, or the potential return to in-
determinate sentencing procedures. 
Critics of the California determinate sentence law have questioned the ability 
of the legislature to cope with its sentencing responsibility. The legislature's recent 
actions mandating imprisonment and increasing penalties will exacerbate the prob-
lem of prison crowding. This early experience suggests the legislature may accede 
to pressures for more penalty increases, despite their correctional costs. 
By authorizing funds for planning prisons, acquiring new prison sites, and 
studying alternatives to prison construction, the legislature has begun to address 
problem of prison crowding. However, even if new facilities are constructed 
they are unlikely to be available until 1986; interim measures to cope with crowd-
ing will be needed the short term. To reduce prison crowding in the long term 
the legislature faces the options of (1) reducing prison terms and commitments, (2) 
increasing community release programs, or (3) increasing prison capacity-none of 
which appears to be politically attractive. 
An agenda for further research proposed in this report is designed to aid the 
legislature in its related decisions about sentence lengths and prison construction. 
Four projects would examine sentence severity under the determinate sentence law 
and how well the law achieves its basic purposes of just punishment, equitable 
punishment, and public protection. The research would compare the achievement 
of these purposes under the determinate and indeterminate sentence laws, and 
could guide modifications to the law to better achieve these purposes within the 
constraints of reasonable prison costs and populations. 
Additional, proposed research would examine effects of the determinate sen-
tence law on prison programs and prison discipline to aid the Department of Correc-
tions and the legislature in decisions about prison policies. Two studies would 
examine the exercise of prosecutorial discretion the determinate sentence 
law and document how court practices under the law limit the legislature's intend-
ed changes in sentencing policies. These studies could aid the legislature design-
ing modifications to the determinate sentence law to assure that its basic objectives 
are 
decisions about the determinate sentence 
viii 
all of these 
scribe how California's criminal justice system is determi-
nate sentence law. To complete this description, the report proposes a multiple-year 
study of the legislature's actions affecting determine sentencing and prisons. Be-
cause of the central role of the legislature under the determinate sentence law, this 
project would serve as the important central focus of a description ofthe California 
experience. 
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This report presents observations about California's initial experience under 
the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act. 1 It also identifies researchable issues and 
a research strategy that will help California policymakers and others assess the 
impact ofthe new law. Current research under way on the California DSL is also 
described. 
The California DSL is part of a national trend in sentencing, moving away from 
reliance on a "medical model" in which the length of incarceration is based on 
individual "needs" and rehabilitation toward a system designed more to promote 
equity, procedural fairness, and just punishment. Presently, Indiana, Illinois, Arizo-
na, Alaska, and North Carolina have adopted varying forms of determinate 
sentencing.2 The growing shift toward determinate sentencing has stimulated 
widespread national interest in the initial experience of these states. report 
draws together existing information about what has in since 
the DSL was adopted. It then a series of research proposals that are 
derived from our review of experience under 
BACKGROUND 
placed in the 
and Women's Board ofTerms 
1. 
prison walls. 
1Chapter 1139 of the Statutes of 1976 as amended. The determinate sentence law is referred to 
throughout the California criminal either as the initials or as 
"diesel." The indeterminate sentence is as the initials 
or as "ice!." We follow these conventions 
2Maine also a sentencing law that as 
feature of decisions-a feature that is 
states such as Minnesota, and ~-'""'"Q'""0 
commissions to achieve some of 
2 
Martinson concluded that, in general, rehabilitation efforts had little im-
pact on reducing future criminal behavior.3 
2. Methods to predict individual post-release behavior could not be justified 
by scientific evidence.4 Norval Morris concluded it was simply beyond our 
technical capability to predict dangerousness. Others pointed out that 
behavior within prisons has not correlated well with recidivism.5 
3. Prison terms varied widely for inmates committing similar offenses.6 
4. The uncertainty of prison terms permitted arbitrary actions by correction-
al and parole board officials, fostered prison unrest, encouraged "gaming" 
to convince the parole board that release was warranted,' and reputedly 
diminished the deterrent effect of a prison sentence. 
5. Parole supervision was questioned as a means to rehabilitate parolees or 
to protect society. In general, parole agent/parolee contact was found to 
be too limited and superficial to produce either ofthese results. 8 Research 
study results did not show conclusively that supervision successfully 
reduced recidivism or provided effective services.9 
6. Basic decisions about sentencing policy were being made by the courts in 
cases challenging Adult Authority actions. 10 This determination of 
sentencing policy through judicial review of individual cases prevented 
development of comprehensive and consistent sentencing policies. 11 
The mounting attacks on the basic assumptions of the ISL during the early 
1970s paved the way for fundamental change. The legislature adopted new sentenc-
ing procedures based on very different philosophical premises. Sentencing respon-
sibility was shifted from the broad discretionary power of appointed boards to 
highly structured and limited decisions by trial judges. 
Under the new system of determinate sentencing, imprisonment has the explic-
itly stated objective of punishment under procedures designed to assure more just, 
uniform sentencing practices. The legislature has assumed direct control of sentenc-
ing, establishing definite terms for specified crimes. The legislation requires judges 
to determine the length of prison terms by selecting among defined ranges and to 
state reasons for selected sentences. The legislation eliminated the Adult Authority 
and Women's Board, replacing them with the Community Release Board12 which 
has circumscribed sentencing discretion (i.e., term fixing for life sentences, 
decisions about good time, waiver of parole supervision) and a new responsibility 
to review sentencing disparity. Table 1 compares the major legal provisions of the 
indeterminate and determinate sentencing laws. 
3Martinson (1975). 
4Morris (1974); Monahan (1978). 
5Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks (1975). 
6President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: 
The Courts (1967); Frankel (1973). 
7See Mitford (1973). 
8Stanley (1976). 
9von Hirsch and Hanrahan (1978). 
10In re Lynch 8 C. 3d 410, 503 P. 2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972); In re Stanley o4 C. A. 3d 1030, 
126 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1976); In re Rodriguez 14 C. 3d 639, 537 P. 2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975). 
11Johnson and Messinger (1977); Cassou and Taugher (1978). 
12'fhe Community Release Board was renamed the Board of Prison Terms as of January 1, 1980. 




COMPARISON OF INDETERMINATE AND DETERMINATE SENTENCE LAWSa 
Item 











Courts decide whether to imprison. 
Legislature sets wide range of 
prison terms. 
Parole Boards set length of 
prison and parole terms. 
No public statement of reasons 
for sentence decision. 
Parole Boards determine sentenc-
ing policy within wide ranges 
set by the legislature. 
Appellate Court (cruel and un-
usual punishment) 
Parole Boards are Adult Author-
ity and Women's Board of Terms 
and Paroles. 
Parole Boards set length within 
ranges set by legislature. 
Parole Boards determine revoca-
tions. 
Corrections' policy subject to 
requirements of court decisions. 
DSL 
Punishment 
Excludes serious crimes resulting 
in life terms (principally first-
degree murder). 
Courts decide whether to imprison. 
Legislature sets narrow range of 
prison terms and increments for 
aggravated cases. 
Courts use legislated ranges and 
increments to set length of 
sentence. 
Good time can reduce sentence by 
up to one-third. 
Community Release Board sets 
length of sentence for lifers. 
Public statement of reasons for 
sentence decision. 
Legislature sets sentencing policy. 
Appellate Court (cruel and unusual 
punishment) 
Community Release Board reviews 
parity of sentences. 
Parole Board is Community Release 
Board (now renamed Board of Prison 
Terms) 
Parole limited to one year (amended 
to three years). 
Community Release Board determines 
revocations. 
Legislatively established system of 
hearings and appeals with right to 
representation. 
aThis table includes only major provlslons and does not reflect changes in the behavior of criminal 
justice agencies (i.e., charging and plea bargaining by prosecutors and the "safety valve" role of the 
parole board in limiting prison population). 
4 
the legislature passed the 
Northern California, the Prisoners Union, and other liberal 
groups supported law because it provided inmates with certain release dates 
and equitable sentencing, and institutional control over inmates. Law 
enforcement and conservatives were dissatisfied with judicial decisions that refor-
mulated sentencing policy and Adult Authority actions they saw as prematurely 
releasing dangerous offenders. They favored legislative determination of penalties, 
believing this would result in more sentencing and increased prison 
terms.l3 While different interest groups supported the change for different reasons, 
the law embodied several primary objectives: 
1. Just Punishment - Section 1170 of the Penal Code provides: 
The legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for 
crime is punishment. This purpose is best served by terms proportionate 
to the seriousness of the offense. 
2. Sentencing Equity - Persons who ,._v,_uu.u 
similar suffer similar provides specified 










The original DSL (SB 42) passed 1976 was due to go into effect on July 1, 
1977.14 Before that date, however, it was amended in several important ways by AB 
476. It was again substantially amended in 1978 by SB 709 and SB 1057. The major 
DSL provisions, as amended, are summarized below. 
The Legislature and Sentencing Policy 
Rather than leave discretion to the Adult Authority for setting prison terms 
within wide ranges, the legislature has defined lower, middle, and upper prison 
terms for specified offenses (Table 2). Subsequent legislation (SB 709) substantially 
increased middle and upper terms for violent felonies (Table 2). The legislature also 




ORIGINAL DSL AND AS 
(in years) 
BY SB 709 
ISL Term Original Term After 
Offense (before 7/1/76) DSL Terma SB 709a 
Second degree murder 5-life 5,6,7 5,7, 
Voluntary manslaughter mo-15 2,3,4 2,4,6 
Rape 3-life 3,4,5 3,6,8 
Robbery 5-life 2, ,4 2,3,5 
Arson 2-20 2,3,4 2,4,6 
Burglary, first degree 5-life 2,3,4 2,4,6 
Burglary, second degree 1-15 16 mo,2, 2,3, 
Assault with deadly weapon 6 mo-life 2,3,4 2,3, 
Vehicle theft 6 mo-10 16 mo,2,3 2,3,4 
Forgery 1-14 2,3,4 2,3,4 
Sale of narcotics 5-life 3,4,5 3,4,5 
Possession of narcotics for sale 5-15 2 ,3,4 2 '3,4 
Possession of narcotics 2-10 ,2,3 16 mo,2, 
show lower, middle, and upper prison terms, respectively. 
b Changed to indeterminate sentence by state initiative. 
709 permits great bodily injury enhancement, unavailable under the 
original DSL. 
..._, ... , .. u<•JO.~'" in Sentencing 
The judge first chooses between a or probation sentence. If the judge 
decides on a sentence, the defendant must be sentenced to the middle term, 
14Legislation is described by the bill number, with AB indicating a bill first introduced in the Assem-
bly and SB a bill first introduced in the Senate. 
6 
unless there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances justifying the upper or 
lower term. 
Enhancements for a specific term of years may be added to the base term. Facts 
calling for enhancement may either relate to the specifics of the crime (e.g., use of 
weapon or firearm, great bodily injury) or to other crimes (e.g., prior prison terms 
or consecutive sentences). These facts must be pled and proved. There are specified 
limits on enhancements that constrain base term increases.l5 
Sentences are imposed during a public sentencing in which the judge must 
consider factors pertinent to various sentencing decisions. Attorneys can offer 
arguments or testimony during those hearings. In imposing a sentence, the judge 
must apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council, which include general 
criteria to guide sentencing decisions, and the judge must state reasons for sentenc-
ing decisions.t6 
All prison sentences are to be reviewed by the Community Release Board for 
disparity within one year. At any time either the Board or the Director of Correc-
tions may recommend that a case be recalled and resentenced. The sentencing 
judge may refuse to recall and/ or sentence. The Community Release Board sets the 
term for prisoners who are not sentenced determinately (i.e., lifers). 
Changes in Parole 
Initially, the DSL limited parole for almost all inmates to a maximum of one 
year, with violators subject to return to prison for a period up to six months. Life 
termers were subject to a three-year parole period. However, SB 1057 amended the 
DSL, increasing the maximum parole period for DSL sentenced offenders to three 
years and for life terms to five years and extending the revocation period to one 
year. 
Continuation ofDSL parole beyond a year and lifer parole beyond three years 
must be justified by a finding of "good cause" by the Community Release Board. 
Under the DSL, parole is not considered a continuation of the sentence but a period 
"tacked on" to the term. The new law defines the purposes of paroles as (1) "super-
vision of and surveillance of parolees" and (2) the provision of services "to assist 
parolees in the transition between imprisonment and discharge." 17 
"Good Time" 
DSL prison terms may be reduced by a total of one-third for good time. Good 
time is automatic unless it is taken away in limited increments for misbehavior or 
failure to participate in work or programs. 18 For a twelve-month period an inmate 
can lose a maximum of three months for misbehavior including assault, escape, 
inciting "successful" riots, falsifying records, possession of weapons and drugs. 
15For example, the total term cannot exceed double the base term unless there is a violent crime or 
other specified circumstances (Penal Code Section 1170.1 (f)). 
16California Rules of Court, Title 2, Div. 1A, rules 410, 414, 416. 
17Penal Code Section 3000. 
18Defined categories of misbehavior result in loss of credits of 45, 30, or 15 days for each activity, 
with losses up to 30 days for failure to participate. 
7 
During a twelve-month period an inmate can lose 30 days for nonparticipation. 
Good time that is not lost during a period becomes vested and cannot later be lost. 
Detailed due process and appeal procedures govern loss of good time. 
Retroactive Application 
A felon is sentenced under the DSL only if his conviction offense was committed 
on or after the effective date ofthe law, July 1, 1977. However, the law was applied 
retroactively, setting a maximum DSL date for all inmates serving indeterminate 
sentences. To determine the retroactive DSL date, the Community Release Board 
applied provisions of the DSL to facts that were proven during conviction. 
Although the law sets out a mechanical method for estimating the term, the 
Board can hold an extended term hearing for dangerous offenders. The Board also 
sets an ISL release date, and felons are released on whichever is earlier-the ISL 
or DSL date. 
Other Institutional Changes 
The DSL sets up the nine-member Community Release Board which has juris-
diction to set terms for indeterminate sentences. The Board has responsibility for 
retroactive application of the law; for reviewing prison sentences for disparity; for 
determining parole revocation, discharge, and extension; and for hearing appeals 
to Department of Corrections' denials of "good time." The Adult Authority and 
Women's Board of Terms and Parole were eliminated. 
The Judicial Council was mandated to formulate sentencing rules, publish data, 
conduct sentencing institutes, and make recommendations to the legislature. Sen-
tencing rules for the Superior Court were adopted effective July 1, 1977. These 
rules describe the objectives of sentencing, criteria for various sentencing decisions, 
and procedures for imposing sentences. 19 The Judicial Council reviews data on 
determinate sentencing in California and other states in its Sentencing Practices 
Quarterly. 
Overall, the new law makes important changes in forums of decisionmaking, 
shifting discretion away from the parole board to the legislature, the court, and the 
prosecutors. 
Exemptions 
The DSL has no specific effect on judges' decisions to suspend sentence or to 
place a defendant on probation; it does not affect misdemeanants. 
Felons sentenced to death or serving life sentences are exempt from provisions 
that affect liarole hearings and the length of parole supervision. Prisoners receiving 
life sentences for homicide or other serious offenses are not covered by the DSL; 
their terms are fixed by the Community Release Board under ISL provisions. 
19California Rules of Court, Title 2, Div. lA. 
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California adopted its DSL during a changes in criminal 
were occurring both in California and nationally. 
1. Increases in rates of 
2. use of explicit guidelines sentences. 
3. Extensions process to uco•ui:>>U<L<> 
4. The of decisions about ..--a·.-ar.,., 
to courts. 
5. Greater openness and public for 
These developments, which are continuing today, predated the enactment 
the DSL. Indeed, the DSL can be regarded as a codification and institutionalization 
of these trends. It is frequently impossible to separate the effects the 
the effects of developments that preceded law that continue to operate in 
conjunction with it. Rather, we propose to examine 
changes in criminal system and 
more fundamental long-term 
A number of legal changes have taken place in '"x>Hli.H 
adoption of the DSL; for example, amendments to 
enactment of mandatory sentencing 
on the criminal cannot 
Because the most con:an•c:u•c" 
20ln addition, death 
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or were 
legislative staff, judges, prosecutors, attorneys, state and correc-
tional officials, prison the members and staff of the Community 
Release Board. 
We examined data provided primarily by of Corrections, the 
Department of Justice, Judicial Council, Community Release Board. 
Because we base our review of the new law on limited data and on impressions 
of a limited sample affected by it, we regard our observations as preliminary. 
We use our review of the DSL to identify for further research continuing questions 
issues of future policy 
ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
Section II of this report reviews criminal justice 
system during the three years since adoption of DSL. Legislative actions in 
adopting and amending DSL are as well as court 
sentences imposed under law, DSL's impacts on nAV'>'flr>h 
cost throughout the criminal justice system. The implications of our findings for 
further are also discussed. 
Section III presents several research proposals designed to further describe the 
effects the DSL and to provide about 
the to their decisions. research how the 
legislature would cope problems in 
would examine prison crowding, correctional programs, 
pline DSL. proposed projects would examine 
would sentence lengths and DSL objectives 
equity, 
the 
II. INITIAL EXPERIENCE UNDER THE DSL 
The DSL caused a number of important changes in the sentencing process. The 
law explicitly restructured the role of the legislature, the judges, and the parole 
board in setting policy and determining the sentence for individual offenders. 
Changes under the DSL appear to substantially increase the role of prosecutors in 
determining sentences. 
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SENTENCING 
An important aspect of the DSL was the legislature's assumption of responsibil-
ity for setting prison terms for specified offenses. Several interviewees who had 
participated in DSL negotiations stated that influential legislators restored this 
responsibility to the legislature primarily because of their dissatisfaction with 
Adult Authority actions. 
One reason law enforcement and prosecutor groups supported this change was 
because they believed that the legislature would set higher penalties in response 
to public demands. The criminal defense bar and some liberal legislators opposed 
this expanded legislative sentencing role because they feared that public outrage 
about atypical, heinous crimes would result in penalties that were too high. How-
ever, inmate groups expressed their willingness to give the legislature direct con-
trol over sentencing policy in order to get rid of the Adult Authority. 
On the other hand, people outside the California criminal justice community 
who were interested in determinate sentencing criticized this central role of the 
legislature, which they saw as too susceptible to popular passions and pressures.21 
It was suggested that the legislature would consider the interests of the majority 
of their constituents who were concerned with public protection and demanded 
harsher penalties, rather than the rights of the unpopular minority directly 
affected by their actions.22 Furthermore, the legislature was seen as having little 
time or expertise to develop a rational sentencing system that would require 
continuing adjustments and fine tuning.z3 
At this time, three years after the DSL was adopted, we have some limited 
experience to judge the sentencing responsibility exercised by the California legis-
lature. Sentencing levels under the DSL were almost immediately amended twice. 
Even before the DSL became effective, AB 476 significantly increased "enhance-
ments" and made important technical and other changes, and only one year later 
the legislature adopted SB 709, which increased penalties for violent crimes (Table 
21Gettinger (1977). 




2). These penalty increases were supported by law enforcement officials led by 
district attorneys.24 
Despite rapid increases in sentence levels, Senator Presley, who authored SB 
709 and SB 1057, predicted that few further increases would affect a great number 
of crime categories because the DSL's major weaknesses were corrected. He fa-
vored giving the law a chance to work. While he foresaw the introduction of bills 
to increase penalties and the enactment of some in response to popular will, he 
believed the legislature would guard against "emotionalism" and would not pass 
unwise penalty increase bills.25 
Through our interviews we have looked at recent actions of the legislature to 
see if, as Presley suggested, the legislature would responsibly exercise its direct 
control over sentencing policy. 
The legislature's actions on sentencing are affected by the actions and relative 
influence of interest groups that take positions on penalty legislation. In general, 
this legislation pits defense and civil libertarian groups-such as the American 
Civil Liberties Union, the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, public defend-
ers, the American Friends Service Committee, and groups representing prisoners-
against law enforcement groups such as the California District Attorneys Associa-
tion, the California Peace Officers Association, and the Attorney General. Judicial 
groups have been only slightly involved. The Association of Judges has generally 
not taken positions on penalty bills; the Judicial Council has taken positions only 
on matters affecting the structure of the judiciary, generally opposing bills like 
mandatory penalties that limit judicial discretion. 
Legislative struggles between these interest groups have taken place primarily 
in the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee. 
The actions of these committees are influenced not only by the positions of interest 
groups, but also by the ideology of committee members; the positions oflegislative 
leaders, the Governor, the Attorney General, and other party leaders; committee 
members' perceptions of voter attitudes in their districts; and their relative im-
munity from political pressures (i.e., how "safe" is their district). 
In general, the Senate Judiciary Committee is regarded as more responsive to 
law enforcement than the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee which for many 
years refused to pass most measures that would have increased penalties.~6 
However, members and staff interviewed who have been involved in criminal 
justice matters believe that the legislature, in recent years, has become more 
supportive of"law and order" measures, making it more difficult for the Assembly 
Criminal Justice Committee to kill penalty increase measures. As one interviewee 
put it: "Politically it's never bad to increase penalties. With assumption of sentenc-
24A special advisory committee of judges, lawyers, and law enforcement officials set up to assess the 
new law drew the conclusion that the law needed modification. Report of the Attorney General's Adviso-
ry Committee to Assess the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, undated. SB 709 was sponsored 
by a coalition of district attorneys. 
25Also, it was reported that district attorneys from the Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Diego, and San 
Francisco areas pledged not to back further penalty increase measures ifthe legislature acted favorably 
on SB 709. See Sacramento Union, April 17, 1979. 
26The Chairman of the Assembly committee saw "law and order" bills as receiving "little review" 
in the Senate because the Senate Judiciary Committee was overworked handling both civil and criminal 
law and because the Senators knew bad bills could be more carefully scrutinized and probably killed 
in the Assembly. See San Francisco Examiner-Chronicle, August 26, 1979. See also Sacramento Bee, 
September 4, 1979, where two former Chairmen of the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee similarly 
describe the role of the legislative committee handling criminal justice measures in each House. 
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pressure to raise sentences. 
to one state .,,._,,_ ... _.,VVA 
Public attitudes have gotten tougher over the last five I been 
in the Senate and the legislature that has responded to get-tough view. 
The people are tired of violent crime and want the legislature to "do some-
thing" about The doesn't what to do to solve the crime 
problem and is frustrated with unsuccessful at rehabilitation. The 
only we can is raise penalties. Some tough bills 
get votes now they would not years ago. 
Legislators' perceptions of tougher apparently 
predate the DSL, but greater sentencing accountability 
resulting from the seem to make resistance to increased penalties more dif-
ficult. district attorneys and law enforcement have been successful in 
the DSL. most recent 
"''The so-called 
16-year minimum "'"'HL'""~" 
sentence second 
13 
pressure measures to penalties 
offenders and sex offenders. To more stringent 
legislation, the Criminal Justice Committee approved a bill (AB authored by 
one ofits own liberal members, Assemblyman John Knox (D-Richmond), that would 
have permitted prison to keep apparently dangerous inmates indefi-
nitely if the state could prove every two years that they could not be safely 
This bill was adopted rather than a tougher, Republican-backed measure that 
required life imprisonment without possibility of parole 20 years for "three-time 
convicted violent crimes. (However, the Assembly had been only five 
votes shy of the majority necessary to discharge this tougher bill from commit-
tee and send it directly to the its passage, AB 29 was vetoed by 
Governor Brown as unworkable and too expensive.29 
A more sponsored by Senator H. Richardson (R-
the Assembly 
'"'c'u"u;:, to its eventual pas-
31 Sacramento Bee, ·"'"''t<>rnh,n· 
32Sacramento Bee, 
33Sacramento Bee, S~>r;tprnh<>r 
threats to remove it 
terms for each 
law enforcement may be introduced in 1980 this 
1979. The amendment was to eliminate the 
definition as well 
Sentinel, 1979. 
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report out "law and order" bills.34 When SB 13 was reported out by the committee 
the ACLU lobbyist called it the "demise" of the committee's "historical function of 
trying to impose some kind of rationality on criminal justice legislation."35 Senator 
Richardson said the vote represented a change in committee attitudes reflecting 
the changing mood of the people.36 Recent history suggests that the committee may 
come under increasing partisan attack, and growing pressure to report out more 
penalty increase bills may be difficult to withstand. Concern about the inability of 
the legislature to withstand political pressures affecting its sentencing decisions in 
the wake of its actions on SB 13 has prompted the Chairman of the Criminal Justice 
Committee to support a legislative study of the DSL that includes examination of 
the alternative of a Sentencing Commission.37 
The increasing prison population and the proposals to increase penalties have 
prompted the legislature to pay greater attention to correctional costs and needs. 
In a then highly unusual move, SB 709, which increased prison sentences, was 
re-referred from the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee to the Assembly Ways 
and Means Committee to permit consideration of its cost impact.38 This was after 
the Department of Corrections initially opposed the bill on cost grounds. The bill 
was significantly amended in the Ways and Means Committee. The nature ofWays 
and Means consideration of the bill is disputed. Most of our interviewees suggested 
that Ways and Means Committee members did not closely examine the cost-benefit 
of increased incarceration of offenders because experience under the DSL was too 
limited to yield data on its initial impact and because they were influenced by a 
desire to support "law and order." It was also suggested that, to the extent cost was 
considered at all, it was looked at as a bill that would not come due for several years, 
and envisioned as minor in the context of a $16 billion budget. Other interviewees 
commented that important ehanges to reduce penalties were, at least in part, a 
result of Department of Corrections estimates of SB 709's effect on prison 
population and associated costs. SB 13 was also opposed by the Department of 
Corrections on cost grounds, but was favorably considered by legislative fiscal 
committees. 
Regardless of whether costs were an important factor in legislative delibera-
tions on SB 709 or SB 13, the legislature has been willing to examine correctional 
needs and may have at least begun to cope with the problem of the increasing 
prison population. Early in 1978 the legislature contracted for an independent 
study of Department of Corrections population projections, facilities, and prison 
classification along with alternate modes ofincarceration.39 After the passage ofSB 
709 in 1978, the legislature provided funds for planning and renovation to 
accommodate the increased prison population (SB 1342). SB 196 approved in 1979 
provided the Department of Corrections with funds for new prison design and site 
acquisition earlier deleted by the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee and 
established a citizens commission to supervise and report on three studies 
34Sacramento Bee, September 4, 1979. 
35Sacramento Bee, August 30, 1979; Palo Alto Times, August 30, 1979. 
36lbid. 
37SB 196 (1979) provides for a study evaluating and making recommendations on the desirability of 
a Sentencing Commission. 
38Reference of penalty increase bills to fiscal committees has since become more commonplace. 
39Approach Associates, California legislature's Study of Correctional Needs, June 1978. 
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exammmg (1) population, capacities, and housing alternatives w:ithin the 
Department of Corrections, (2) alternatives to correctional placement for convicted 
felons, and (3) comparisons of ISL, DSL, and sentencing commissions in meeting 
criminal justice objectives. However, the legislature refused to provide the $100 
million reserve fund for prison construction which officials claim is needed because 
of legislation increasing penalties. 
With the passage of the DSL, the legislature took greater control over deter-
mining sentences and prison population. Its recent actions show a tendency to 
increase penalties in response to public and political pressures, and an apparent 
reluctance to explicitly consider cost as an important factor influencing its actions 
on penalty increases. Rather, it has chosen to deal with costs later and separately 
as a budgetary matter. Moreover, it appears that many of the politically active 
groups supporting penalty increases do not necessarily support new prison con-
struction. 
The central issue facing the legislature is how to cope with the problem of rising 
prison population and prison crowding which has resulted in part from its own 
sentencing decisions. 
To reduce long term prison crowding the legislature has the options of either 
(1) reducing prison terms and commitments, (2) increasing community release 
programs, or (3) increasing prison capacity, none of which appear politically attrac-
tive. 
Even if new prisons are constructed, additional beds are unlikely to be available 
until 1986. Thus, interim measures are needed to cope with short-term crowding. 
Driven by increases in population, the legislature has provided funds for correction-
al planning and site acquisition, but as yet has been unwilling to provide funds for 
new prison construction. How well the legislature is able to handle both its expand-
ed sentencing responsibility under the DSL and the problem of prison crowding 
remains to be seen. Early experience suggests that the legislature may well have 
difficulty withstanding pressures for piecemeal changes in the penalty structure 
which in turn may raise questions about the rationality of its sentencing policies 
and may exacerbate the problem of prison crowding. 
THE COURT PROCESS 
The DSL substantially changed courtroom procedures for determining sen-
tences and also set policy for the sentences to be imposed. The DSL imposes a more 
structured procedure for calculating sentences and greater formality for sentencing 
in open court. Under both the ISL and DSL, sentences are imposed during a 
separate sentence hearing, but this hearing is defined somewhat more formally 
under the DSL. In addition to permitting arguments, if either side has cited circum-
stances in support of an aggravated or mitigated sentence prior to the hearing, the 
court must receive evidence offered about such motions. The court must reach a 
decision for all pertinent sentencing choices under the DSL and must also state 
publicly the reasons for sentencing decisions. For felons sentenced to prison, judges 
must determine the sentence length by selecting one of three legislatively deter-




charges and enhancements 
prosecutors have greater power 
ability of enhancements. Some 
"charge inflation" under the DSL. 





Overall, there is a general recognition that the DSL makes the bargaining 
process easier and more meaningful. The parties can typically bargain over a set 
of alternative dispositions offering fairly fine differences in the level of punish-
ment. Sentence bargains are apparently facilitated by this flexibility in choices, as 
well as by the certainty that the agreed upon sentence will in fact be carried out. 
In particular, defendants appear to be willing to agree to a bargained sentence if 
they know that the punishment cannot be increased. Data indicate that many cases 
are being disposed of more quickly. Attorneys and judges identify those more 
readily settled cases as those involving the least serious offenses. If so, this suggests 
that the DSL may have accomplished a more desirable use of courtroom resources 
-ready disposition of minor cases, permitting more thorough consideration of 
serious cases. 
Table 3 
TIME OF GUILTY PLEAS IN SuPERIOR CouRT AS PERCENT OF 
CAsEs REACHING SuPERIOR CouRT 
1975 1976 1977 1978 
At arraignment 21 24 24 33 
After arraignment 49 50 51 43 
Total 70 74 75 76 
SOURCE: Bureau of Criminal Statistics. 
Many interviewees observed that this power of prosecutors entails the greatest 
potential threat to equitable sentencing. Critics of determinate sentencing suggest 
that prosecutors' exercise of broadened discretions will make it impossible to 
achieve more equitable sentencing.44 They allege that expanded plea bargaining 
power (i.e., through decisions to charge enhancements or recommend mitigating 
circumstances) will permit prosecutors to obtain convictions on evidence; that 
prosecutors' willingness to bargain away charges or enhancements to avoid trials 
will formalize the disparity in sentencing between felons who plead guilty and those 
who go to trial; that variations in prosecutorial practices will produce greater 
disparity among felons convicted from different areas. 
Some critics also suggest that prosecutors will be able to abuse their broadened 
discretion since, unlike judges, they are not required to publicly disclose reasons 
for their bargaining decisions. Moreover, recent legislation increasing penalty lev-
els increases the bargaining strength of prosecutors. Judicial sentencing decisions 
are constrained by the DSL sentencing the Sentencing Rules for Superior 
Courts, and the requirement to publicly state reasons sentence choices. 
sentencing decisions are also constrained by prosecutorial decisions-judges can 
only select among sentencing options proved by prosecutors. However, prosecutori-
44Alschuler (1978). 
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al decisions about filing or negotiating are substantially unconstrained by statutory 
or regulatory structures and need not be publicly justified. Unfortunately, at this 
time there is no available information about how prosecutors use their discretion 
or the effects of prosecutorial discretion on sentence equity. 
The Judges 
Some critics oppose the DSL because of its sentencing complexity and suggest 
that judges would find its provisions too difficult to implement. Trial court judges 
received training on the law through sentencing seminars. As a result, most judges 
apparently can work within the technical complexities of the law. Department of 
Corrections personnel report that while the first sentences under the law were 
often calculated improperly, now relatively few sentences have such problems. 
Most dispositions are still determined by negotiations. Under the DSL, judges 
continue to differ in their involvement in the plea/sentence bargaining process. 
Some judges report becoming directly involved in sentence negotiations with the 
defense and prosecution.45 Other interviewed judges report they will not enter 
directly into negotiation processes.46 Frequently, the parties will negotiate only a 
guilty plea and agree that the case will result in a prison sentence, but they will 
leave the length of the sentence up to the judge. Bargains for a plea without a 
specified sentence seem to reflect both the increased power of the judge in actually 
determining the sentence independently of a bargain and the increased power of 
the prosecutor who can obtain an agreement to prison sentence without having to 
stipulate to the length of that sentence. 
Because of the increased importance of the conviction offense in determining 
the sentence, judges may be rejecting more negotiated pleas. Without the Adult 
Authority to "look past" the conviction offense and base sentences on the real 
nature of the crime, the conviction offense now becomes more significant, determin-
ing the actual prison sentence. As a result, some prosecutors observed greater 
judicial scrutiny of negotiated settlements. 
The DSL mandated the Judicial Council to develop sentencing rules and cri-
teria about granting or denying probation; imposing lower or upper terms; impos-
ing concurrent or consecutive sentences; and adding to sentence length for 
enhancement such as a prior prison term, carrying a deadly weapon, or inflicting 
great bodily injury. The resulting Judicial Council Rules provide guidance on fac-
tors to be considered in sentence determination, but they have been criticized as 
being "so broad and flexible that retention oftotal discretion in the judiciary is the 
clear effect."47 
Some interviewees suggested that the reasons provided by judges for their 
sentencing decisions either are "boilerplate" or otherwise provide little informa-
45'fhese judges report mediating sentences between both parties, e.g., the judge may send a defendant 
charged with second degree murder to prison because of the prosecutorial interest in the case. However, 
the judge may accept a plea to manslaughter and sentence under the lower term in order to obtain the 
defense agreement to the sentence. 
46With these judges, the prosecution and defense may enter into a negotiated sentence which the 
judge is free to reject. However, if the judge rejects the negotiated sentence, defendants can withdraw 
their offer to plead guilty. 
47Smith and Newcomb (1977). 
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tion that would form the basis for systematic review of the true factors governing 
sentence determinations. As of now there has been no systematic analysis of judges' 
written sentencing reasons. However, appellate courts have reviewed reasons giv-
en for sentences, reversing cases where the reasons are inconsistent with the DSL 
or Sentencing Rules. 
Probation Departments 
Probation departments apparently have come to play a more important role in 
the sentencing process through their preparation of the presentence investigation 
(P&S) reports describing the results of their investigation of the circumstances and 
background of particular cases.48 There is a universal recognition that P&S reports 
have been changed substantially under the DSL because they are more pertinent 
to sentencing determination.49 
The role of the P&S report in the sentencing decision appears to vary between 
cases that have been tried and those that have not. Judges indicate that when they 
have tried a case they use relatively little information from P&S reports, drawing 
principally upon information about prior record. Some interviewed judges and 
prosecutors were critical of the quality of the P&S report, claiming the quality has 
deteriorated since the passage of Proposition 13. The content ofP&S reports appar-
ently has changed, with more emphasis on facts of the crime and a defendant's prior 
record and less emphasis on a defendant's background and social circumstances. 
Probation offices also frequently calculate suggested sentences and cite sentencing 
factors in the Judicial Council Regulations that pertain to the particular case. 
Defense attorneys indicated increased attempts to provide input for P&S reports, 
while prosecutors reported little involvement in the preparation of the reports. 
Because of the evidentiary nature of the P&S report, probation officers in some 
counties are being called more often to testify during sentencing hearings.50 
Sentence Hearings 
Interviewees all agree that attorneys rarely use sentencing hearings to present 
evidence about sentence choices. As one judge said, the P&S report serves as a 
sentencing hearing. However, a few private attorneys are using it in an attempt 
to obtain more favorable sentences for their clients. This introduces the possibility 
that resources available to a defendant and his attorney may substantially influ-
ence the quality of sentencing hearings, and therefore the nature of the sentence. 
This could introduce economic bases of disparity in sentencing. 
48When a referral from the court is received, the probation department looks into the facts of the 
case and develops pertinent factual, social, and psychological information. 
49Also, under AB 469, P&S reports must now contain statements by victims. 
50 As a result, there has been some shift toward defining special court probation officers who testify 
in cases whether or not they prepared the presentence report. This reflects the conclusions on the part 
of some probation administrators that ordinary probation officers were "torn apart" during sentencing 
hearings. Although there apparently has been a substantial increase in the frequency of probation 
officers' testimony during sentencing hearings, such testimony still occurs in relatively few cases. 
20 
Incarceration 
Since the effective date of the DSL, more convicted defendants are being incar-
cerated in prison than previously. However, it is unclear whether the recent com-
mitment increases can be attributed to effects of the DSL. Prison commitments 
began to rise before the DSL, and several data sets differ about whether the 
increase is greater since the DSL came into effect. 
California Department of Corrections (CDC) data show a dramatic rise in the 
number of male felons received from the court after the effective date of the DSL. 
Male felon prison commitments per 100,000 California population rose from 32.4 
in 1977 to 39.2 in 1978, the highest recorded rate in the history of the Department 
of Corrections (Fig. 1).51 The Corrections data show steady increases in commitment 
rates since 1972, but in 1978 there is a discontinuity in this steady pattern with the 
1978 rate showing a substantially greater increase than for any previous year. 
45r-----------------------------------------,---~ 
70 71 73 
Year 
SOURCE: California Department of Corrections, Program and Facilities 
Planning Report, March 15, 1979 
Fig. 1-Prison commitment rate per 100,000 population (CDC data) 
51The first year that commitments show the major effect of the DSL is 1978, since 62 percent of 
'"""nrn"'""ofCorrections commitments in this were made under the new law. In 1977 there were 
few DSL commitments, 13 percent the July 1 effective date. 
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Fig. 2-Sentences in the superior courts (BCS data) 
Table 4 
PRISON CoMMITMENTS AS PERCENT OF SuPERIOR CouRT CoNVICTIONSa 
Prison Commitments 
(percent of convictions) 
Item 9/30/77a 12/31/ 77a 3/31/78a 6/30/78a 9 I 30/78a 
State total, all crimes 27 30 33 33 33 
Selected crimes: 
Robbery 56 61 64 62 63 
Assault with deadly weapon 25 30 26 34 24 
Burglary, first degree 37 37 39 42 47 
Burglary, second degree 26 30 31 32 34 
Grand theft, amount over $200 and 
unspecified 20 21 20 23 26 
Grand theft (auto) and vehicle theft 19 26 27 28 36 
Forgery 28 33 37 33 37 
Checks (NSF) 24 28 22 15 22 
Receiving stolen property 21 22 23 24 20 
Possession of narcotics 22 26 32 33 40 
Possession of narcotics for sale 35 43 48 49 41 
Sale of narcotics 22 29 31 31 32 
All drug law violations 17 21 24 24 26 
Sentencina 
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received straight probation terms. Increases in local along with short 
DSL prison sentences, apparently reflect a of 
sentences for less serious crimes. 
In short, all of these data suggest that the incarceration rate in California has 
increased since 1972 and continues to increase under the DSL. These trends indi-
cate that the DSL must be seen as part of a continuing pattern in California of 
sending more and more convicted felons to prison and to jail. This pattern might 
have continued past July 1, 1977 even without the DSL. On the other hand, the DSL 
may have extended this trend and stabilized it at a higher level than would other-
wise have occurred. 
There are a number of possible reasons for the toughening of sentencing prac-
tices. During the 1970s public support for tougher "law and order" was demon-
strated by the passage of statewide initiatives on the death penalty. Also, a number 
ofincumbent Superior Court judges have lost elections after campaigns attacking 
their "lenient" sentencing practices. The legislature reacted to this public mood by 
adopting several mandatory prison sentencing laws and modifying the Proba-
tion Subsidy Act, removing incentives to utilize probation and local jail for certain 
offenses. Even when prison is not mandated, judges are aware of the public and 
legislative interest in punishing convicted felons with incarceration. 
Several features of the DSL may have magnified the effect ofthis trend toward 
tougher sentencing. The DSL requires judges to provide reasons for their decisions. 
This greater public accessibility under the DSL makes it easier for the media and 
interested citizens to monitor judicial sentences, thereby increasing the political 
risks from lenient sentencing. Also, under the DSL, judges can set a limited prison 
term for felons convicted of relatively non-serious crimes without possibility 
that a parole board will inappropriately extend their terms. Finally, limiting parole 
length to one year under the initial law apparently encouraged defendants to accept 
short prison terms rather than go to the county jail or the California Rehabilitation 
Center (for civilly committed drug addicts) which carried longer probation or 
parole terms. 54 
Sentence Lengths 
While there is a clear increase in the number of felons being sentenced to prison 
at this time, comparisons of the length oftime served in ISL DSL 
are difficult to make and interpret. sentence lengths under ISL 
from year to year, depending on Adult policies 5). Second, 
length of a DSL sentence depends on the amount of good time credit received by 
an inmate. While most inmates appear to be earning most of credits, the 
Department of Corrections does not yet have hard evidence about good time. 
Moreover, Department of Corrections and Community Release Board policies on 
good time could change sharply, affecting the overall lengths of terms. Recognizing 
these limitations, we examine current terms and then estimate the effects of SB 
709, which increased penalties for serious offenders. 
54Parole has now been lengthened to a possible three years. If parole considerations were important 
explanations of the increased prison rate, we would expect to see a drop in the prison rate. 
26 
Data provided by the Department of Corrections suggest that at least initially 
under the DSL (i.e., before AB 709 had an impact) prison terms were shorter than 
terms served under the ISL. Table 5 lists the median term served for inmates 
released to parole from 1970 to 1977, as well as the median length of terms imposed 
by courts through June 30, 1979, under the DSL. 
The imposed DSL sentences are slightly longer than previous ISL terms. How-
ever, to be comparable to data on lengths of prison terms under the ISL, those DSL 
sentences must be reduced to reflect credit for time served in local jails (a median 
of three months) and credit for good time, which can be up to one-third of the 
imposed sentence. As Table 5 reflects, the median time served in prison for inmates 
receiving DSL sentences during the first years of the law will be between 21 and 
33 months. Since the Department of Corrections reports that most inmates are 
Table 5 
COMPARISON OF ISLAND DSL SENTENCE LENGTHS FOR MALE FELONS 
(In Months) 
ISL 
Median ISL Number Released 
Year Prison Term to First Parole 
1970 36 5007 
1971 36 6261 
1972 32 4914 
1973 30 2939 
1974 35 2694 
1975 39 6918 
1976 34 5430 
1977 30 6734 
1978a 26 6726 
DSL 
Imposed Actual 
Sentenceb Term Number 
Year (Median) (Median)c Sentenced 
1977-78 36 21-33 2827 
1978-79 36 21-33 6590 
SOURCES: California Department of Corrections, Program 
Analysis and Recommendations, April 1, 1978, Appendix I and 
Memorandum, "Two Years Experience Uniform Determinate Sentencing 
Act, July 1977-June 1979," December 14, 1979. 
al978 releases include 205 inmates serving DSL sentences and 
43 serving both ISL and DSL sentences. 
bMedian length of prison sentence imposed by the court. 
cRange of prison term that could actually be served. Minimum 
reflects credit for time in jail before delivery to prison (3 
months) and one-third reduction for good time; maximum reflects 
no good time credit. 
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receiving most of their good time, the median will be closer to the low end of this 
range. 
Thus the DSL appears to have reduced the average length of California prison 
terms from their levels of the past nine years, but the significance of this is clouded. 
Shorter prison terms under the DSL may reflect only the increased rate of incarcer-
ation. Under the DSL a larger proportion of felons sentenced to prison have been 
convicted of property crimes that carry shorter sentences. Their greater numbers 
would bring down the average, even if term lengths stayed the same for each 
conviction offense. 
If the DSL did shorten the lengths of terms, we should see a reduction for 
specific conviction offenses. Other Department of Corrections data can be used in 
comparing ISLand DSL terms for inmates convicted of robbery (Table 6), burglary 
(Table 7), and assault (Table 8). Again assuming that inmates receive most of their 
good time, these data show a substantial reduction in the length of prison terms for 
burglary. However, the data suggest only a slight reduction in the initial DSL 
sentences for violent crimes. Initial DSL prison terms for robbery were slightly 
shorter than ISL terms of inmates released in 1977, and they were about the same 







CoMPARISON OF ISL AND DSL MEDIAN LENGTH 
TERMS FOR RoBBERY 
(In Months) 
1st Degree 
Robbery 1st Degree 2nd Degree 
with Firearm Robbery Robbery All Robbery 
45 (lOOl)c 38 (565) 
39 (818) 30 (417) 
48.5 (190) 35 (772) 29 (411) 29-44 (756) 
45 (220) 34 (664) 27 (380) 29-45 (1524) 
SOURCES: California Prisoners 1975, Table 33A; Cali-
fornia Prisoners, 1976, Table 33A; Number and Time Served 
in Prison before First Parole, Male Felons Paroled 1977 
and 1978, MIS March 9, 1979; California Prisoners 1976, 
Table 47A and Two Years Experience Uniform Determinate 
Sentencing Act, July 1977-June 1979 Summary Statistics 
Department of Corrections, Sacramento, CA., Dec, 14, 
1979. 
aLength of term served for inmates released that year. 
bRange of prison term that could actually be served for 
inmates sentenced that year. Minimum reflects credit for 
time in jail before delivery to prison (3 months) and one-
third reduction for good time; maximum reflects no good 
time credit. 




n.n . uv., OF AND MEDIAN LENGTH 
TERMS FOR BuRGLARY 
(In Months) 
ISLa 
Year 1st Degree 2nd Degree All Burglary 
1975 43 ( 213) c 31 (961) 
1976 34 (17 5) 24 (782) 
1977 31 (243) 22 (1002) 13-21 (597) 
1978 29 (260) 19 (1249) 13-21 ( 1283) 
~---~-- ~~~---··--------
SOURCES: See Table 6. 
aLength of term served for inmates re-
leased that year. 
bRange of prison term that could actually 
be served for inmates sentenced that year, 
Minimum reflects credit for time in jail be-
fore delivery to prison (3 months) and one-
third reduction for good time; maximum re-
flects no good time credit. 
of inmates released or sentenced 














Firearm Firearm All ADW's 
40 (35) 
3 7 (52) 
41 (455)c 
34 (324) 




SOURCES: See Table 6. 
of term served for inmates re-
leased that year. 
of prison term that could actu-
ally be served for inmates sentenced that 
year. ~linimum reflects credit for time 
in jail before delivery to prison (_3 
months} and one-third reduction for good 
time; maximum reflects no good time 
credit. 
of inmates released or sen-






uu"UL>Jv• of short 
offenses would likely 
most recent years under the ISL. 
effect of the on term lengths from 
prison terms were above even the longest 
23 years 4). Moreover, term lengths were 
year to year as Adult policy 
""'"""'»"' show that between 1975 and 1978 there 
DSLmay 
''
6The Adult Authority alternated between releasing inmates and 5). Of 
more inmates remained in years of releases. When many inmates were 
to have served sentences. 
may partially reductions in median term 
many inmates who lower retroactive DSL terms were released 
terms. 
""'·uu.ac1ug the effects ofSB 709 we have assumed that the practices 
uu•"•w•uscu. We assume that if a judge had sentenced defendant convicted of 
to SB 709, he would also have sentenced that defendant to the upper term 
With this we add the increments in base terms for defendants 
receiving upper and middle terms. Of course, this unrealistic. in cases where 
the terms have been increased more severe upper 
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Fig. 4-Length of terms for California prisoners released between 1945 and 1978 
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SB 709 will mean longer sentences for many felons sentenced after January 1, 
1979. By our estimates, one-third of the convicted robbers will serve at least eight 
months longer than robbers with DSL sentences before SB 709. Almost two-thirds 
of the convicted burglars will serve an extra eight months, and another quarter will 
serve an extra sixteen months. Half of the rapists will serve an extra sixteen 
months, with another third serving at least 24 months longer. 
The resulting median sentences will be greater than DSL sentences before SB 
709, but they will not be appreciably different from the ISL terms of inmates 
released in 1977 (Table 9). If felons earn all of their good time, median sentences 
for robbery and burglary will still be less after SB 709 than 1977 ISL terms. The 
median sentences for rape, with the greatest increase under SB 709, would be 
one-half year longer than 1977 ISL terms even if a convicted rapist earned all of 
his good time. 
These comparisons of medians do not show the biggest effects of SB 709: in-
creases in the lengths of extreme terms, felons who receive particularly long prison 
sentences.59 As evidence about extreme cases, Table 9 indicates the mean of 
sentences under present sentencing practices and our estimates of the mean 
sentences under SB 709. The greater increase in means than medians under SB 709 
shows that the amendment will have a substantial impact on the longest sentences. 
Sentence Decisions 
Table 10 indicates judicial decisions to sentence on the lower, middle, or upper 
base term for a variety of conviction offenses and groups of offenses. The table, 
derived from data reported by the Judicial Council for the period from July 1, 1977 
to September 30, 1978,60 indicates that across all sentences judges are most likely 
to impose the middle term. Failing this, judges are substantially more likely to 
impose the upper rather than the lower term. The use of upper terms is particularly 
strong for crimes against persons, where judges are twice as likely to sentence 
defendants under the upper than the lower term. For sex offenses judges are almost 
four times as likely to choose the upper rather than the lower term; for robbery 
cases the upper term is almost three times as likely to be chosen. Among property 
and drug offenses judges are more likely to select the middle term. For theft and 
drug offenses they use the upper and lower term about equally often. 
In contrast, the Judicial Council's sentencing practice data reflect narrower use 
of the DSL provisions for adding enhancements to sentences and for imposing 
consecutive sentences. As Table 11 indicates, the only enhancements that are used 
frequently are those dealing with arming and weapon use. Prosecutors and judges 
appear to be making thorough use of weapon enhancements for robbery. For 60 
percent of robbery cases the prosecution pled and proved either an arming allega-
tion (P.C. 12022) or use allegation (P.C. 12022.5). Together, weapon enhancements 
under one of these provisions are imposed in 50 percent of the robbery cases. For 
these more severe upper terms. As a result there will be fewer upper term sentences, and our estimates 
of increased sentences under SB 709 will be somewhat overstated. Thus, we probably overestimate the 
mean and perhaps the median sentences after SB 709. 
59Medians do not fully reflect the greatest increases in SB 709 sentences for upper terms since they 
show changes only for inmates at the middle of the distribution. 
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JUDICIAL SENTENCING DECISIONS AND 
IMPOSITION OF BASE TERMS 
Percentage of 
Sentences in 
Lower Middle Upper 
Offense Term Term Term 
All personal crimes 13 57 31 
Homicide 18 53 29 
Assault 16 58 26 
Sex crimes 10 52 37 
Robbery 11 58 30 
All property crimes 15 64 22 
Burglary 14 63 23 
Theft 19 62 19 
Drug crimes 20 61 19 
All crimes 15 60 25 
SOURCE: California Judicial Council, 
Sentencing Practices , Nos. 2-5, 
July 1, 1977 to September 30, 1978. 
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The more severe enhancement for a prior prison term a violent crime under 
P.C. 667.5a is rarely pled and proven, although the Judicial Council data for this 
enhancement cannot be interpreted precisely. There appear to be no substantial 
differences between personal and property crimes in the imposition of enhance-
ments for priors.62 
There is relatively little use of the great bodily injury (GBI) enhancement. 
Overall it has been imposed in only about 2 percent of the sentence 
cases. 
Finally, approximately 25 percent of all determinate sentence cases 
sentencing for multiple counts. Consecutive sentences are imposed in 40 percent of 
multiple count cases or in 10 percent of all cases. The imposition of consecutive 
sentences is somewhat higher in personal crimes; consecutive sentences were im-
posed in 14 percent of all crimes and in 16 percent ofthe personal crime 
of robbery. 
Our interviews with participants in criminal justice system suggest that 
plea bargaining practices may be an important factor influencing the 
imposition of enhancements. Almost all participants in the judicial process indicate 
that defendants now appear to be more willing to a prison term as part of 
the sentence bargain. As part of the bargain for a prison term, prosecutors will 
frequently drop an enhancement for a record. 
62'fhere may be several reasons for the minimal use of prior record to enhance sentences. 
Prosecutors report that prior record is "hard to "Documentation of prior is often absent; 
prosecutors may learn of priors only during course of a case-long after filing. Prosecutorial 
practices may also discourage use of prior enhancements. The establishment of a prior requires a search 
for and introduction of evidence that is unlike evidence usually found in criminal cases. Instead of 
physical evidence or witness testimony, the enhancement for a prior requires the search for and 
establishment of a "business record," evidentiary procedures on which prosecutors may have little 
experience or interest. Perhaps for these reasons, enhancements for priors may be the charge most 
likely to be negotiated away to obtain a defendant's plea. 
Table 11 
PERCENTAGE OF CASES WITH IMPOSITION OF ENHANCEMENTS 
-~-
Great Bodily 
Arming Use Injury Prior Prison 
(12022) (12022. 5) . (12022. 7) (667.5b) 
Principal Total Pled & Pled & Pled & Pled & Multiple 
Offense Cases Proved Imposed Proved Imposed Proved Imposed Proved Imposed Charges Consecutive 
Robbery 1743 24% 19% 36/~ 31% 5% 4% 10% 8% 37% 16% 
Personal, 
other than 
robbery 1638 11 8 23 19 3 3 7 4 31 12 
Personal, 
including 
robbery 3381 18 14 30 25 4 3 9 6 34 14 
Property 3151 1 1 1 .5 • 5 .5 10 7 19 8 
All cases 7787 9 7 13 11 2 2 8 6 25 10 
-










Disparity in Sentencing 
Equitable sentencing was a principal goal of the DSL. The law sought to avoid 
the previously great differences in sentences for defendants who committed similar 
crimes. The elaborate sentencing structure established by the DSL attempts to 
prevent great variation in sentences. Also, the DSL added a new review procedure, 
the disparate sentence review, to monitor and reduce unwarranted variability in 
judicial sentencing practices. Under that procedure the California Community Re-
lease Board is to review all prison sentences within one year of their commence-
ment to discover sentences that are disparate. Judges will be notified of cases that 
received shorter or longer sentences than comparable cases, or cases that received 
prison terms when comparable cases rarely received such terms. Sentences that are 
found to be more severe than similar cases will be returned to the sentencing judge 
with a motion for a recall and resentencing. 
The disparate sentence review, by an administrative board reviewing judicial 
sentencing practices, is a unique procedure for providing equitable sentencing. The 
Community Release Board plans empirically based simulations of each of the sen-
tencing decisions made by judges for choices such as selection of base terms, en-
hancements, and probation versus prison.sa The review process has not been fully 
implemented at the time of this report. Rather, the Board has conducted a series 
of limited "interim" reviews. For the first 725 cases received between July and 
December 1977, the Board found no sentences that were disparately long. 
An Abt Associates study suggests that the DSL has reduced the overall variabil-
ity in the lengths of prison terms.64 The range for the middle 50 percent of all DSL 
prison terms is 1.5 years compared to 2 years for the ISL years from 1968 to 1975. 
For burglary, the middle 50 percent range is one-half that of the ISL years. 
Before the DSL, disparity in the rate of prison commitments per 100,000 popu-
lation varied between geographical areas of California, with less populated areas 
sending a greater proportion of convicted felons to prison than more populated 
areas (see Table 12). Recent data indicated that this geographic variability in prison 
commitment rates continues but that highly populated areas of the state now have 
commitment rates more comparable to those of lower population areas. Commit-
ment rates have gone up in most areas of the state, but this increase is greater in 
the most populous counties. Among the many factors that may account for geo-
graphical differences in commitment rates are population differences, differences 
in arrest and prosecutorial policies, differential impacts of mandatory sentencing, 
and changes in state policies, including fiscal limitation (Proposition 13) and modifi-
cation of the local reimbursement formula in the Probation Subsidy Act. 
A striking change in imprisonment rates between the pre- and post-DSL periods 
was the atypically rapid increase in rates for San Francisco and Alameda counties. 
While the commitment rate per 100,000 population increased from 30 to 39 state-
wide, the rate for San Francisco went up from 50 to 84 and for Alameda from 25 
to 46. 
63See Gelman et al. (1977). For each prison case and a sample of probation cases, the Board has 
collected information bearing on matters involved in the Judicial Council's Sentencing Rules. Informa-
tion is coded from the abstract of judgment, charging documents, Bureau of Identification "rap sheet," 
probation officers' reports, the reporter's transcript of proceedings at the time of sentencing, and any 
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SOURCE: California Department of Corrections. 
~er 100,000 residents. 
Finally, the DSL and its several amendments have created the basis for sys-
tematic differences in sentences among defendants who committed their crimes at 
different times. Provisions for retroactive application of determinate sentences 
attempted to eliminate the temporal disparity between offenders who committed 
crimes prior to the July 1, 1977 effective date of the DSL and those who committed 
crimes after that date. However, amendments to the DSL only apply to offenders 
who committed the act after the effective dates ofthe amending legislation. Thus, 
the amendments have created the basis for temporal disparities in sentences. 
CORRECTIONAL PROCESS 
Although the DSL was directed primarily at the sentencing process, the law has 
also had important effects on the correctional process. The law modified the term 
of parole and the length of parole revocation and made a number of changes in 
prison disciplinary procedures. The law also created "good time," a procedure that 
was unnecessary with indeterminate sentences. The greatest impacts of the DSL, 
however, have certainly been indirect, resulting from changes in the sentencing 
process. Of these, the most been the change in prison population. 
Prison Population 
As noted earlier, there has been a sharp increase in the commitment rate to 
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(See Table A.1 of the present report.) 
5-California male prison population-sources of entry and exit 
powers between 1968 and 1977,70 and concerns about it policy were certainly 
instrumental in the adoption of the DSL. However, the DSL virtually eliminated 
the use of parole releases to reduce prison population. 71 There simply is no relief 
valve for reducing overcrowded prison conditions. 
Figure 5 also indicates why California prisons will continue to face a problem 
of growing population. As we have considered, in contrast to the stable pattern in 
judicial sentencing practices for the previous 15 years, the rate of prison sentences 
has grown steadily from 1972 through 1978. The number of male felons sent to 
prison per year doubled during this period. Now, the DSL appears to have contrib-
uted to the substantially greater, apparently stable increase ofprison sentences.72 
This increase, together with the elimination of the relief valve provided by the 
70Should prison release decisions have been made on the basis of prison population constraints rather 
than on a consideration ofthe effects of released inmates on the free population? Did alternating periods 
of liberal and constricted parole release create intolerable disparities between inmates entering prison 
at different times? 
71With determinate sentencing, the Community Release Board now has only limited power to release 
prison inmates, i.e., the 15 to 20 percent of prison inmates serving life sentences. 
72Increasing judicial use of imprisonment as a sentence for felons predated adoption of the DSL. 
Nevertheless, the DSL and the numerous mandatory sentencing laws adopted in recent years have 
contributed to the growth in prison sentences and have probably institutionalized those practices at a 
stable pattern in which prison sentences may be double the rate of previous years. 
Adult Authority, will produce continued 
prison population. The Department 
necessary double ceiling. Depending on one's 
problem now or will face it in the near future. 73 
The Department has projected that its male felon 
exceed the single cell capacity of its institutions by 9,000 in 
a building program to house 4,000 male and 400 female inmates in new institutions 
not exceeding 450 in capacity. The cost of construction is estimated at 
with operating expenses over the first 10 years anticipated at 
the legislature has approved planning, design, and site 
new institutions, it has not yet provided construction money. 
New prison construction has been opposed by a coalition 
church groups.75 They offer a number of arguments about why new "''''"'r"' 
unnecessary: 
First, California prison sentences are too high compared to the national aver-
age and other countries-they should be reduced. 
Second, as a related argument, increasing the prison population does not 
crime. Despite both of these contentions, however, the legislature has 
increased the length of sentences. 
Third, critics of prison construction argue that the prison 
cline by the time new prisons are open, in part because of a 
population of high-crime prone young men. But projections over 
do not suggest that demographic trends will produce a "'"""'"~""' 
California prison populations. Because of the 
demographers project that any decrease in the 
and delayed in California. Persons between the ages of 18 and 
largest group of migrants into California. As a result, state 
for 18- to 35-year-old men show an increase of 15 
1985, at the same time that the passing of the 1950s 
the number of men in this age group in most other states. 
35-year-old men in these years will likely have a 
Americans and blacks who have higher rates of 
73At the present time, there may be some uncertainty about whether the 
exceeds its capacity. The Department of Corrections has space available in muuu1wu 
it has deactivated a large facility at San Luis Obispo and several camps. 
all of these restrictions on bed space: High security risk inmates cannot be 
and also inmates attempt to avoid the California Correctional Center at Susanville, a uwumum 
the deactivated facility at San Luis Obispo is a severe fire hazard, to fire mspe(:tOJrs 
camps were given to and are now productively used other state and, even 
available, their minimum security status would not the present 
74California Department of Corrections, Program 
75Groups opposing added prison construction include the American 
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, the American Civil Liberties 
neys for Criminal Justice. 
76The 18-35 age population is projected to decline 6 percent ""'""'""' 
decline by less than 1 percent between 1995 and 2000. 
Counties 1975-2000, Series E-150, Department of Finance, December 
California. Recent discussions with state officials responsible for l-'VJl-'"''""'v" "'"'""''''""'" 
that immigration of persons between 18 and 35 years of age is 
770ur rejection of these arguments does not mean that we agree with 
that we accept that minority young men should be imprisoned at 





























SOURCE: California Department of Corrections, Program and Facilities Planning Report, March 15, 1979. 
Fig. 6-Prison disciplinary incidents in California 
Perhaps of greater importance, the substantial growth in prison population engen-
dered by the DSL may substantially aggravate problems of prison discipline. 
Figure 6 does not show any clear effects of the DSL on prison In 1978, 
under the DSL, the incidence of disciplinary events has increased over level of 
1977; however, this increase is less than has occurred in the previous two years. 
Informal discussions with prison officials, again, provides ambiguous information. 
Some officials believe that the loss of the Adult Authority "stick" greater due 
process protection have given inmates substantially more independence, 
aggravating disciplinary problems. Other observers, both inside outside the 
Department of Corrections, question whether the parole-release power of the Adult 
Authority was ever an effective device for controlling inmates.79 
Provisions for good time were added at the request of the Department of 
Corrections because of fear that loss of Adult Authority powers would make it 
harder to control inmate behavior. Corrections first reported relatively light use of 
the provisions of the DSL permitting loss of good time. The procedures for remov-
791'hey suggest that both before and after the DSL, the Department of Corrections used a range of 
informal punishments to control inmate behavior. Prison officials can impose light punishments, such 
as weekend or holiday lockup, short-term loss of privileges, or extra work for minor rule violations. For 
serious rule violations, officials generally use segregation, change, isolation, or transfer 
to less desirable institutions. 
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time are cumbersome, and Corrections personnel were still interpreting 
ambiguous language used in the DSL to authorize loss of time. Recent comments 
indicate that the denial of good time is increasing. Inmates we interviewed gener-
ally perceive denial of good time as a potent sanction. Although denial of good time 
might currently be used sparingly, it is another among many threats that can be 
used by prison authorities to impose discipline. 
Some Department of Corrections staff and some inmates wonder whether the 
DSL's elaborate due process provisions for removing good time have created 
greater distance between inmates and Correctional staff and eliminated informal 
procedures for resolving inmate disputes. For example, in the past some fights 
between inmates were resolved by having inmates confront each other under su-
pervision of prison staff. Now, with hearings, witnesses, and so on, these informal 
procedures have been forgone and antagonisms that lead to fights may be hardened 
rather than resolved. 
Prison Treatment Programs 
Some interviewees said they believed that the DSL specification of punishment 
as the purpose of imprisonment and the elimination of Adult Authority incentives 
and direction would cause many treatment programs to be curtailed or eliminated. 
However, in the view of Corrections officials the legislature did not intend to 
eliminate these programs. The legislature has, in fact, increased amounts budgeted 
for various treatment and education programs (see Table 13). This annual budget 
increase, together with the DSL provision of good time for program participation, 
may indicate that the legislature continues to recognize the potential value of 
treatment programs. 
Table 13 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS EXPENDITURES AND BUDGET FOR 
INSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS, 1977-78 TO 1979-80 





























SOURCE: Governors Budget 1979-80 and 1980-81 








The DSL has also had 
various prison treatment programs. Department of 
the level of participation in education and other treatment programs 
slightly after the effective date of the statute, but has subsequently 
previous level. Participation in vocational education programs remained at 13 
percent of the inmate population for the year beginning July 1, 1977, the same rate 
as the prior fiscal year.80 We do not have comparative figures for academic 
education, but 28.6 percent of the inmate population participated in academic 
programs during the second quarter 1978.81 
The DSL probably affected inmates' attitudes and reasons for participation in 
programs. Instructors in education programs report that inmates are more moti-
vated to take courses when they see them as benefiting themselves on release, not 
just satisfying the suggestions or expectations of the Adult Authority. As a 
the education program has shifted away from basic high school education toward 
skills programs to aid inmates in coping after their release. Some correctional 
report observing that inmates are likely to plan their time constructively. 
suggest that inmates generally do little to plan their time on a 
only begin seriously considering their for 
nears. This suggests that an early time fix 
Retroactive Application of the DSL 
The DSL required the Community date 
ed under provision of the DSL for all uuua"""" 
release date could be extended by the 
criminal history met one of five conditions set out in the DSL. A 
sentence could only be extended after an extended term hearing. 
given notice of such hearings and were by counsel. 
The Board screened about 18,000 cases for potential extended term 
between August 5, 1977 and September 12, 1978.8' Approximately 15,000 cases were 
given the retroactive DSL date calculated under the mechanical formula 
in the statute without an extended term hearing. Cases identified as potentially 
appropriate for extended terms were scheduled for hearings upon agreement 
two members of the Board. Extended term hearings were scheduled for 3043 
inmates. Of cases scheduled for extended term hearings, 2057 or 68 percent the 
scheduled cases received extended terms. "Average" term extensions ranged 
between two and three years for different offenses. Maximum extensions greatly 
exceeded these averages. Table 14 indicates the average and maximum term 
extension for seven conviction offenses. 
Interviewed Community Release Board members and staff involved in retroac-
tive application of the law said they would have preferred either that the law had 
not been retroactively applied or that the Community Release Board had 
given general guidelines rather than "mechanistic" rules to calculate terms. Most 
80Report of the California Department of Corrections, "Vocational Education," January 1979. 
81California Department of Corrections, Program and Facilities Planning March 1979. 
82The method for calculating this date is specified in the DSL and is based on middle term 
among an inmate's conviction offenses, plus applicable enhancements, if any. 
8
'
3Data were obtained from internal Community Release Board memoranda dated March 2, 1978; 
June 12, 1978; and October 20, 1978. 
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Table 14 
ExTENDED TERMS FOR SEVEN CONVICTION 0FFENSESa 
Conviction Offense 
Murder, second degree 
Manslaughter 
Kidnapping 
Robbery, first degree 
Assault 
Rape 
Burglary, first degree 
Average 
Number Enhancement 


















~erived from internal Community Release Board memo-
randa dated March 2, 1978; June 12, 1978; and October 20, 
1978. 
other interviewed observers concluded that the Board administered a difficult task 
as well as could be expected. However, interviewed inmates were highly critical of 
the Board's extended term hearings.84 
Among those inmates released under retroactive provisions were about 100 
offenders transferred from state prisons to Atascadero State Hospital because they 
were found to be mentally ill. These inmates had served an average 3.8 years 
beyond the discharge date computed by the Community Release Board under the 
DSL. Many had been convicted of serious crimes including murder, manslaughter, 
first degree robbery, assault, rape, or kidnapping. These inmates were released 
either on parole or directly to the community. 
The Community Release Board followed the behavior of those released for 
several months and concluded that their arrest and recommitment experience was 
no greater than that of other offenders with similar records released from institu-
tions, although some had exhibited "bizarre" behavior. Preliminary review of data 
supplied by the Department of Justice, which followed up on those released for one 
year, suggests that their post-release behavior may not be significantly different 
from that of other paroled prisoners. Forty-six percent had no subsequent criminal 
history during a one-year follow-up period compared to between 40 to 46 percent 
of parolees not designated mentally disordered violent offenders who remained 
"clean" in the years 1973 through 1977.85 
A similar DOJ follow-up of mentally violent offenders released from the De-
84Inmate objections were probably intensified by the Board's policy of notification about retroactive 
sentences. The Board first notified all inmates of their release date mechanically calculated under 
provisions of the DSL. Inmates scheduled for extended term hearings were notified of the hearings after 
receiving this mechanically determined date. Thus, many inmates felt that the Board had been two-
faced in first "giving," then extending the retroactive DSL date. 
85Forty-three of91 offenders released from Atascadero had no arrests or parole violations. Data were 
not provided for six additional released prisoners who died after release, several of whom committed 
suicide. If all the deaths are considered as resulting from subsequent criminal activity, then 42 percent 
rather than 46 percent had no subsequent criminal history. For data on parole outcomes, see Outcome 
for Male Felons Released to California Parole from 1973 through 1977, Sacramento Research Office 
of California Department of Corrections, October 31, 1978. 
ries. 
returns. The length of the 
in 1975, median pre-DSL 
months. 
on parole, the number of parolees was subs tan-
and December 31, 1978, the felon parole 
14,557 to 9,997. During the first year of the 
to have declined. Parole caseloads re-
purpose of parole and 
those sentenced. Since 
parole population has steadily 
August 1979, a 16.5 percent 
supervision, the Community Release 
exercise of its authority to directly 
prisoners approved for discharge were 
(about and parole release groups (about 
months and one year based on their 
Through this study the Board intends 
in the discharge review and to determine 
more extensively employed in the future. 
administrative expenses. The change-
estimated one-time expenses for the 
of$1.5 million for development 
records and counseling practices. 89 
the related extended term hearings also 
Actual expenditures for the 
of Corrections, $1,200,000. 
$875,000; Department of Corrections, 
Community Release Board during its 
$2 million more than for the Adult 
Paroles in 1976-1977. However, more than half of the eXJJerlm:mr 
retroactive application of the law and the new 
Continuing administrative expenses for all state 
range upward of$5 million per year. New continuing expenses 
Release Board above those pf the Adult Authority 
and Paroles appear to range between $500,000 and 
additional administrative costs on counties for court processes 
Public Defender and District Attorney costs for 
elaborate P&S reports, and court costs for calculating "'""-J.C<=HLJu15 
hearings. 
State law provides that these costs are reimbursable to 
only Orange County has filed a claim for reimbursement. 
County's claim for reimbursable expenses to other counties cot.aUHi:>JJv0 
court-related costs at around $4 million.92 These additional u'"'''"""'""'"~ 
are modest in comparison with annual court, prosecutor, 
$450 million to $500 million. 
The major element of additional DSL cost arises from 
tions. SB 42 would probably have slightly reduced 
a potential savings wiped out by the lengthened terms 
Additional operating expenses for the increased 
were projected at almost $150 million between 
Department of Corrections also projected a 
million.94 
As we discussed above, prison population was 
Therefore, the additional cost of the DSL and its cuLn:-uuuJvU 
to be substantially less than the figure of $300 lHL<uuu "''''"uaccu 
accommodate its increasing population. 
ing penalties will further increase correctional costs. 
Initial cost savings projected for the 
been overwhelmed by the larger prison 
under SB 1057. The Department of 
penses of $3 million annually. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The related issues of prison conditions and "~t:•"U"~v" 
ing policy are central to our proposals 
91$600,000 of this is for the disparate sentence review for fiscal 
920range County filed a claim for $420,000 of which $256,000 
be within its guidelines. 
93The Department of Corrections estimated a $27.4 million 
new prisoners per year. Since new prisoners are substantially 
be reduced or eliminated. 
94The Department of Corrections estimated increased 
first year and additional parole expenses of million. 
"Implementation of AB 476," 31, 1976, in Dick Howard 
Capital ts 








2 • 8 
2,923 28.4 
than , 000. Total is re-
.5 million reserve construction, 
on $50,000 per bed. 

III. PROPOSALS FOR RESEARCH 
Our review of the California Criminal Justice System under the DSL identifies 
several continuing issues that are critical to the success of the law: 
e The legislature's decisions about sentencing policy and responses to in-
creasing prison crowding and costs. 
• Prison conditions under the DSL. 
• Prosecutors' use of their extensive discretion under the DSL. 
Research in these issues is central to describing the initial effects of the DSL 
and to examining how California copes with major problems ofthe post-DSL period. 
Research should be directed toward helping California policymakers cope with 
these major problems and determining how well the law achieves its major objec-
. tives. 
The remainder of this report describes existing research and our proposals for 
further research, which includes studies of the central role of the legislature in 
criminal sentencing; correctional programs and security; court implementation of 
sentencing policy; and the effects of prosecutorial discretion. 
In addition to these specific policy issues, many persons are interested in de-
scriptions of criminal justice operations under the DSL. Particularly, policymakers 
in other states would benefit from a thorough description of how California crimi-
nal justice agencies are adapting to determinate sentencing and to the specific 
elements of California's DSL. 
DESCRIPTION OF COURT AND CORRECTIONAL 
PRACTICES 
Two research projects currently under way to study court and correctional 
practices under the DSL are being directed by Jay Casper at Stanford University 
and Sheldon Messinger at the University of California, Berkeley.95 
Both studies are examining court processes under the DSL through interviews 
with participants in selected jurisdictions and through direct observation of court 
and negotiating practices in those jurisdictions. Together, the two studies should 
provide somewhat independent descriptions of how judges, attorneys, and defen-
dants perceive the available sentencing options, how they engage in plea and/ or 
sentencing bargaining, and how participants otherwise use the elements of the new 
law. 
Messinger also plans to describe operations of the California prison system 
under the DSL, basing his descriptions on interviews and observations carried out 
in greater scope than those considered in the present report. That study should 
provide more detailed consideration of the implementation of the DSL, the appar-
95Messinger's research is part of a multi-state examination of determinate sentencing. Andrew von 
Hirsch and Richard Sparks of Rutgers University are responsible for other aspects of this project. 
50 
51 
ently increased crowding, and the beginning effects of both on institutional order 
and procedures. As part of the same research project, Elliot Studt will examine 
operations of the Parole and Community Services Division of the Department of 
Corrections and actions of the Community Release Board affecting parole super-
vision and revocation. 
Similar descriptive research should thoroughly examine the legislature's ac-
tions affecting sentencing and prison capacity and operations. An appropriate 
study oflegislative action affecting the DSL cannot be conducted within the finan-
cial or time constraints of either the present study or the Berkeley-Rutgers study. 
PROJECT I: RESEARCH ON THE ROLE OF THE 
LEGISLATURE IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING 
Critics have raised many questions about the appropriateness and implications 
of selecting a legislature as the sentence-determining body. They have suggested 
that the legislature will inevitably raise penalties in response to political pressures 
and will be unable to maintain a reasonable balance between specified crimes and 
punishments for them, or penalties for greater and lesser offenses. There is no 
dispute that the legislature has ultimate responsibility for establishing a legal 
framework for determining criminal penalties. This issue is related to the amount 
of discretion that should be retained by the legislature or delegated to administra-
tive agencies or the courts to decide pel)alties for specified crimes. While assertions 
have been made about the implications of a greater legislative sentencing role, little 
empirical research has been undertaken to examine in detail the actual behavior 
of a legislature with determinate sentence responsibility. California offers a natural 
experiment for examining the general issues of legislative determination of de-
tailed sentencing policy. 
A study of the California legislature is also important in understanding and 
evaluating the state's DSL. Our review indicates that future legislative action in 
adjusting sentences and dealing with prison costs and capacity are central to the 
future of the DSL. Both of these research purposes suggest a study investigating 
legislative decisionmaking about penalty measures, related budgetary issues, and 
other measures affecting prison population. 
The role of the legislature in sentencing should be studied over a period of 
years, including the years before passage of the DSL, through the period of amend-
ment and implementation of the law. This would provide a historic perspective to 
the current legislative actions dealing with sentencing. The research period should 
continue for at least several future years, during the critical period in which the 
legislature must decide about prison construction while it continues to face pres-
sure for increased penalty levels. During this time, it is likely that the legislature 
will either have to provide funds for prison construction, modify sentencing policy 
to reduce prison intake, establish an administrative agency to set prison times, 
reintroduce indeterminacy, or establish a substantial program of non-prison alter-
natives for felons. If the legislature does not make effective choices using these 
alternatives, basic decisions will then be made by intervening courts. 
For each year during the studied period, the research should identify the major 
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Examination of correctional records 
veys of inmates and staff about the un~n-<.•vu•oo 
tion of stress and institutional difficulties, inmates' 
participation in work or programs, the amount 
surveys could also be used in the studies we propose 
discipline under the DSL. 
Research on Rehabilitation 
Although the DSL redefined the purpose of prison to 
than rehabilitation, California prisons continue to 
educational, and voluntary programs intended in part to 
Our interviews with correctional staff and inmates suggest 
programs has changed under the DSL and that the reasons 
inmates' participation in programs have also changed. Of 
inmates and staff indicate that rehabilitation programs may 
that rehabilitation is no longer a purpose for 
more voluntary. 
Given the change in purposes of the California prison ""''ralrn 
of Corrections should have basic information with which to reassess 
value of programs that it will continue to offer. J."''"c':u 
of continuing programs both as assessed by inmates 
inmates into society after prison. 
Research should explicitly consider the cost 
education, and voluntary programs involve 
ment of Corrections. With growing prison populations 
for expansion of programs and greater difficulty in uu~""'F> 
to support them. Review of the costs and apparent benefits 
plans to continue, expand, or reduce particular programs. 
First, the research should catalog each of the programs 
tution both before and after the DSL. The catalog NlU'u"u 
programs, indicate the number and frequency 
the demands that programs place on funds, prison space, 
The research should survey both inmates and 
tions about changes since the DSL, and 
some programs the survey of inmates might be able to 
The Rand Corporation as part of its 1978 survey 
Rand survey obtained inmates' reasons for 
programs and their assessment of them. 
Research should also explore the value that programs 
inmates' adjustment after prison. This could be 
99'fhe offender survey was directed by Mark Peterson and examined sell-reJ"or·ts 
before incarceration and correlates of criminal behavior. A of correctional nrn="m 
ed by Joan Petersilia in conjunction with the offen~r survey. report of 




Figure 8 indicates the two groups 
levels under ISL and 
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Time of sentencing 
Time of crime 
Before August 1976-
August 1976 * July 1, 1977 t 
Prior to July 1, 1977 True ISL Transition ISL 
July 1, 1977 or later 
.. 
DSL was passed in August 1976. 
t Effective date of DSL was July 1, 1977. 
t Crimes committed before July 1, 1977 are given ISL sentences, 
although sentenced after effective date of the DSL. 
Fig. 8-Comparison of ISL and DSL cases 
After 
July 1, 1977 
Transition ISL 
under DSL t 
True DSL 
received different disposition under each sentencing system, and to establish 
the length of DSL sentences and case features that account for differences in 
sentence length. The Rand and Berkeley-Rutgers data are the only existing data 
that can be used to compare the proportion of prison cases under ISLand DSL. No 
other data separate DSL cases from ISL cases sentenced after July 1, 1977. How-
ever, both the Rand and Berkeley-Rutgers data sets lack the length of terms for 
prisoners under ISL and thus provide no basis for comparing the length of prison 
sentences under ISLand DSL.to6 
The third and fourth sets shown in Table 16 are the OBTS107 data maintained 
by the Department of Justice and the Judicial Council data on sentencing practices. 
The OBTS data indicate the prison rate under ISV08 and the first transition period 
from August 1976 to July 1, 1977. However, neither of these data sets provides 
other information needed to compare ISL and DSL sentence lengths. 
Department of Corrections data, the fifth source shown, provide the only basis 
determining the actual length of prison terms. Good time and predelivery 
credits must be subtracted from imposed sentences to compare the true length of 
terms with ISL terms. Judicial Council data indicate preprison credits, but 
only the Corrections data indicate good time credits. 
sixth source is data currently collected by the Community Release Board 
as part of its disparate sentence review. The Board collects all of the information 
might be estimated from CDC data. 
UU<enaeNJaS(~Cl transaction system. 
wsoBTS data also indicate the prison rate for the period from August 1976 to July 1, 1977. 
Table 16 

















LSL I IRAN I ISL/ I DSL llSL I TRAN llSL/1 DSL I T!Uu'!l ISL/ I DSL I ISL I TR!II-ll ISL/1 DSL I ISL I TR!IN llSL/1 DSL 
DSL DSL DSL DSL DSL Comments 
Rand X X X X 
Berkeley "'~'"b'-~"-~ X 
---------t ---+--1----.- ~ -+---+-----l----+-----j----+----
Department of 
Corrections 
_luJ,i c Council Comhiued 
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court practices on policy of just punish-
sentences actually imposed by courts re-
seriousness of offenses. Simple 
ranges of sentences for various of-
Figure 
of 1978 for offenses 

statistical analyses would 
whether imposed sentences" 
seriousness. These analyses could 
different crimes, controlling for the 
analyses could indicate whether cases in 
more seriously, controlling for the 
VH1'-'••::u court actions and the underly-
can analyzed to see if the length ofprison terms 
true seriousness of cases, indicated by facts, 
call for longer sentences under the 
Release Board data could also establish 
was created either by filing, bargaining 
identification ofthe source of the problem would 
the sentencing structure. 
of the California DSL. Because of the 
the legislature should 
provisions that affect sentenc-
issue is particularly important since recent 
may increase sentencing inequi-
attempts to promote equitable 
court practices under the DSL and the 
disparate sentence review on sentence 
sentences must differ, both with regard 
or and the length of prison terms, 
seriousness of crimes and, perhaps, an offender's back-
other, illegitimate differences in sen-
provides some limited specification 
""'j'""c'u"'c", e.g., weapon use, prior prison record. 
for the Superior Courtll5 substantially 
serve as legitimate bases for sentencing 
to be as serious as 3, 4. 5 year term offenses that involve 
to account for the statutory provisions that some 
offenses (e.g., a great bodily injury enhance-
truth of factual statements in pre-sentence reports from 
is reduced somewhat by the opportunity for both 





ll9Peterson and (1980). 
em-
alternatives to protect 
'"'?'"'"'''""' can examine in quite different ways the 
intended 
ine prosecutors' u~"'~"'o 
tions. These studies 
of filing, negotiating, 
also be useful in 
Rand is collecting uc,,a,Jc<Ou 
County, and the 
Rand data have 
contain details 
and prosecutor and court 
collected by the Community 
although somewhat more 
Examination of prosecutorial 
120Robbery provides more sensitive comparison. SB 709 """"'"'"u 
not the middle. Therefore, unlike for other crimes 
decrease in imposition of upper terms, but little or 
121The Judicial Council will have statewide data 
conviction offenses. However, their data do not indicate the 
a non-prison sentence, the data do indicate 





DATA USED TO GENERATE 
Table A.l 
CALIFORNIA PRISON PoPULATION-SouRcEs 
OF ENTRY AND EXIT 
Male New Net 
Prison Court Parole 
Population Convictions Releases 
1958 17,237 5,146 2050 
1959 17,093 5,426 4155 
1960 19,232 5,701 2716 
1961 21,03tl 5,842 3197 
1962 20,384 5,863 4610 
1963 22,262 5,030 3365 
1964 22,136 4,983 3928 
1965 21,893 5,626 4509 
1966 22,666 5,169 3407 
1961 22,904 4,872 3697 
1968 23,504 4,667 3328 
1969 22,350 4,496 4809 
1970 20,460 4,426 
1971 16,952 4.472 
1972 16,470 4,272 4201 
1973 19,167 4,839 1747 
1974 21,283 5,081 2457 
1975 16,598 5,433 9038 
1976 17,459 6,463 4769 
1977 16,667 7,065 7328 
1978 20,172 8,753 6273 
SOURCE: California Department of 
Convictions, and Facilities 
Planning Report, March 15, 1979. 
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